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The adviser written off: Messages attributed to Amon describe a break with Cuneyd Zapsu

The SICPA dossier, Part 2. Messages attributed to Philippe Amon and said to date from 18 September 2019 describe an instruction to stop consultancy payments to Cuneyd Zapsu. Following the TRY 19.6 million in invoices examined in Part 1, this instalment turns to the account of a breakdown in the relationship, its stated political grounds, and the questions left unanswered.

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Philippe Amon on the left and Cuneyd Zapsu on the right in an editorial portrait collage.
AI-assisted editorial collage based on archive portraits. It does not depict an actual meeting or reproduce source messages. — The Ledgers

The record

18 September 2019, 00:36. According to a dossier supplied to The Ledgers, a WhatsApp message said to have been sent by SICPA’s chief executive and principal shareholder Philippe Amon to a contact in Turkey contained this instruction: “Please stop all payments we are doing to Mr Zapsu for international consultancy work as of today.”

The dossier says four more messages followed fourteen minutes later, at 00:50. The last contained three words: “Send to Halil.”

This account alleges that an instruction was given to end the consultancy relationship with Zapsu. It does not, by itself, establish whether the instruction was implemented or the precise date on which payments ceased. The original WhatsApp images and audio files were not independently authenticated for this publication, and the identities of the recorded speakers were not confirmed. The private communications below are reported within those limits.

Part 1 of this investigation described TRY 19.6 million in invoices, excluding VAT, issued by Zapsu’s company to two SICPA entities between 2015 and 2019, and a payment schedule ending in September 2019. The dossier supplied for Part 2 offers an account of an instruction to halt payments that month, connecting the relationship to a discussion of political background.

Buying and providing consultancy services is lawful. This report examines an account of records concerning the consultancy relationship of a company carrying out public contracts, and the questions it raises. It does not present unverified allegations as a finding of criminal conduct.

A seven-year relationship and TRY 19.6 million in invoices

According to the CV cited in Part 1, Zapsu’s SICPA consultancy began in April 2012. The dossier places that starting point alongside SICPA-Assan’s tax-stamp tender litigation and the subsequent tender period. It supplies no document connecting Zapsu to that litigation. The invoice account begins in 2015.

According to the calculation published in Part 1, Zapsu’s company invoiced SICPA Security Solutions SA and SICPA Turkey for a combined TRY 19,618,764 excluding VAT between 2015 and 2019. Using annual average exchange rates, that was approximately US$4.6 million. About TRY 7.77 million was invoiced to SICPA Security Solutions SA in Switzerland, and TRY 11.85 million to SICPA Turkey.

The payment schedule did not name a company. Part 1 associated it with SICPA Turkey on the basis of matching amounts. According to the dossier, it includes a fixed “consultancy fee” of US$120,000 plus VAT per quarter between August 2017 and July 2019.

A second category, appearing sixteen times between July 2018 and September 2019, is labelled “DÖSİMM payı bedeli” — a DÖSİMM share payment — totalling approximately TRY 7.96 million including VAT. DÖSİMM is the Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s revolving-fund enterprise responsible for tendering museum ticket operations. The sources cited in Part 1 place the start of these payments about four months after SICPA Turkey won the ticketing contract for 54 museums and archaeological sites in 2018 with a TRY 3.9 billion bid.

No contract or service record establishing what these payments purchased is available for this report. The messages attributed to Amon describe “international consultancy”, while one payment category bears the name of a Turkish public enterprise. That is one of the central points requiring explanation.

Halil’s question

The dossier also recounts another WhatsApp message said to have been sent to Amon, with no visible date. Its author is described as one of Amon’s contacts in Turkey but is not identified.

According to the account, the author says he had met privately with “Halil İbrahim”, who was “disappointed, but more than that, hurt” and had treated him “very harshly”. The issue was why he had not been told about the Zapsu contract in advance.

The same message account says SICPA’s Brazilian case had come up in Ankara. “Halil İbrahim” reportedly said he “can deal with” that matter but was unsure about the Zapsu contract. Because the message’s date is unknown, and it is unclear whether it preceded or followed the payment-stop instruction, a definite causal connection between the two exchanges cannot be established.

The Brazilian context appears in public sources. Correio Braziliense reported on 27 May 2019 that SICPA executive Charles Nelson Finkel had been sentenced to eleven years and six months in prison. A Brazilian public document also records a June 2021 leniency agreement involving SICPA and CEPTIS worth approximately 762.7 million reais. According to SICPA’s 2023 statement, the individuals concerned were acquitted on 8 June 2022. These developments are not a finding concerning the consultancy payments in Turkey.

The undated message reportedly describes Zapsu as an adviser to “SICPA SA, not SICPA Turkey”, and the payment as an internal compliance matter. The invoice account in Part 1, however, includes TRY 11.85 million invoiced to SICPA Turkey. The dossier does not explain that difference.

An instruction spanning fourteen minutes

According to the dossier, the first of five messages sent between 00:36 and 00:50 on 18 September 2019 instructed that payments stop “as of today”. The reason attributed to Amon is: “Sicpa can not be involved in politics and our only objectives is to serve Governments.”

The messages timed at 00:50 reportedly state that the Turkish chief executive had been given a “strict instruction” to cut “all relations” with Zapsu, and assert that Zapsu’s “political background” had not been known. According to the dossier, the same sequence says the relationship had “nothing to do with Turkey”, was based on “international consultancy”, and that SICPA had “only one loyalty”.

Zapsu’s political history is publicly documented. His own biography says he co-founded the AK Party, served in its leadership between 2001 and 2008, and was the party chairman’s special assistant and data coordinator. It is unclear whether the reference to “political background” attributed to Amon meant those past positions or relationships in 2019.

Another instruction recounted in the dossier is that the “past cost of international consultancy” should not be carried forward and should be “deducted from all business plans going forward”. In the message account, these words suggest the Zapsu relationship was being treated as a past cost. No record of how that instruction was reflected in the accounts is supplied.

The final line is again: “Send to Halil.” The dossier’s authors identify “Halil” and “Halil İbrahim”, whose surnames do not appear in the messages, as Halil İbrahim Danışmaz. That identification was not independently confirmed for this publication. The object of the stated “one loyalty” is not specified either.

The account of a conversation a year later

The dossier also cites an automatic transcript of an audio recording said to date from 24 September 2020. A statement attributed to Danışmaz is quoted as: “The Cüneyt move was perfect.” The dossier says the name appears as “juneit” in the automatic transcript. It is not clear from the context whether the “move” refers to the instruction to end the relationship a year earlier or to a different development.

In the same transcript account, remarks attributed to Danışmaz urge Amon to be careful in his contacts with Zapsu in Turkey and allege that Zapsu was close to Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan. That alleged closeness has not been independently verified. No document is supplied showing that Zapsu had a connection to the parties they founded.

Amon’s attributed reply is: “When we talk to him, it’s always about the Davos and this.” Zapsu’s official biography lists him as a senior adviser to the World Economic Forum between 2012 and 2021.

In the political timeline presented in the dossier, the payment-stop instruction comes five days after Davutoğlu’s resignation from the AK Party on 13 September 2019. Babacan had left the party in July 2019. The proximity of those dates does not, on its own, prove Zapsu’s political preference or the reason for the instruction.

From “Send to Halil” to DNS

Danışmaz’s role in DNS İnovasyon is a separate strand of the dossier. The Ledgers’ DNS report of 15 October 2026 examined the contract between DNS and Turkey’s Mint and SICPA’s role in the arrangement. According to that earlier report, SICPA supplied the technology, software, machinery and operations; Amon was among those named as signatories for SICPA Turkey in the SICPA–DNS contracts.

Akif Hamzaçebi’s parliamentary document on tax stamps identifies Danışmaz as DNS’s founder and sole shareholder. It also dates the tender notice, cancellation, transfer to the Mint and new procurement procedure. Its assessments and questions should not be read as a judicial ruling.

The chronology set out in the dossier, public sources and the earlier report is as follows:

• 18 September 2019: Messages attributed to Amon instruct that payments to Zapsu stop and include the words “Send to Halil”.

• 18 October 2019: A new tax-stamp tender is announced.

• 6 December 2019: The tender is cancelled. The reasons include a letter stating that the Mint could perform the work.

• 22 January 2020: A Revenue Administration–Mint protocol transfers the work to the Mint.

• 18 April 2020: A presidential decision opens the way for negotiated procurement without an announcement, or direct procurement, for certain Mint purchases subject to security and confidentiality conditions.

• 29 July 2020: The Mint–DNS contract is signed, according to the earlier DNS report.

• 28 August 2020: The SICPA–DNS cooperation agreement cited in the earlier report.

• 15 September 2020: Tax-stamp price increases of 100–400% take effect, according to the Mint announcement cited in Hamzaçebi’s document.

• 24 September 2020: The conversation transcript bearing this date in the dossier discusses a local-partner model.

This sequence places events in time. It does not, by itself, prove a causal connection between the instruction concerning Zapsu and the DNS contract.

The 2020 transcript account attributes to Amon a strategy of finding the right local partner in major markets while keeping SICPA out of view. Remarks attributed to Danışmaz describe the arrangement in Turkey as the “optimum model” and say the Mint’s name creates a “comfort zone” for public institutions.

The transcript account also describes discussion of adding new products to the existing contract. Another sentence attributed to Amon objects to the same people working on museum and tax-stamp operations: “They cannot be mixed. Mélange des genres, we say in French.” The French expression refers to mixing roles that should remain distinct.

The dossier describes Danışmaz as a former executive of the Washington-based Turkish Heritage Organization. Hamzaçebi’s allegation that DNS retained a difference of approximately TRY 215 million a year, and the rejection of the parliamentary inquiry motion by AK Party and MHP votes, were reported by Gazete Duvar on 12 January 2022. That financial allegation has not been independently verified. According to the earlier DNS report, the work was transferred to DİAS in August 2021.

The Philip Morris contradiction

The CV cited in Part 1 was examined as a source indicating that Zapsu advised SICPA and Philip Morris International at the same time in 2012–2013. It does not establish an uninterrupted relationship continuing to the present. There is no information beyond the CV about the scope and duration of the PMI consultancy.

SICPA supplies governments with tax-stamp systems for tracking tobacco products; PMI is one of the manufacturers whose products those systems track. Part 1 also described the companies’ competition in tracking technologies. Having the same adviser serve both sides raises questions about whether the parties knew of the other appointment and how any potential conflict of interest was handled. It does not, by itself, prove a violation.

The account of the transcript said to date from 2020 attributes serious allegations to Amon concerning PMI’s relationship with the illicit tobacco market. The dossier says Amon extended that allegation to Zapsu and asked that it be conveyed to a minister.

These allegations have not been independently verified, and no document establishing a link between Zapsu and illicit tobacco trading has been supplied. Statements in the unconfirmed transcript should not be treated as factual findings about Zapsu or PMI.

In a separate dispute, PMI called similar allegations in a 2020 New York lawsuit “unfounded” in its response to OCCRP. That earlier statement was not a response specifically addressing the transcript discussed here.

An older public record must also be distinguished. The European Commission’s 2004 announcement described a twelve-year agreement with PMI involving payments potentially totalling approximately US$1.25 billion and ending earlier contraband disputes. Evidence submitted to the UK Parliament explains that the agreement did not constitute an admission of liability by PMI. That agreement is not evidence supporting the allegation concerning Zapsu.

The question this section leaves open is: if the words attributed to Amon were indeed spoken, how had the earlier consultancy relationship with Zapsu been assessed, and what was the basis of the subsequent allegation?

Questions still unanswered

The questions below identify the gaps in the report. No information is available for this publication establishing that they were sent to the parties or that replies were received. No party is alleged to have refused to respond.

For SICPA and Philippe Amon:

• Did you instruct that payments to Zapsu stop and the relationship be cut off on 18 September 2019? Are the reported messages yours?

• Who was the “friend” whom the dossier says you spoke to that night, and how did the conversation relate to the decision?

• What was meant by the statement that you did not know his “political background”? What services did SICPA retain Zapsu to provide?

• How did a relationship described as having “nothing to do with Turkey” relate to the SICPA Turkey invoices and the “DÖSİMM share payment” category?

• What did “only one loyalty” mean? Why were the messages to be sent to “Halil”, and who was that person?

• Were the statements about Zapsu and PMI attributed to you in the 2020 transcript actually made? If so, what was their basis, and why was it requested that they be conveyed to a minister?

For Cuneyd Zapsu:

• Were you aware of any decision by SICPA in September 2019 to end the consultancy relationship? Were you given a reason?

• Did you have any connection to Ahmet Davutoğlu’s or Ali Babacan’s new political movements in 2019–2020?

• Did your contacts with Amon and your services to SICPA continue after September 2019?

• What is your response to the unverified tobacco-trading allegation concerning you in the transcript account?

For Philip Morris International:

• What were the dates and scope of your consultancy relationship with Zapsu? Were you aware that he also advised SICPA?

• What is your response to the unverified allegations attributed to Amon?

Method, sources and what remains unknown

Part 2 draws on a dossier supplied to The Ledgers and a comparison of its information with public sources. The dossier describes four groups of sources: two WhatsApp screenshots; two audio files said to date from 24 September 2020 and an automatic transcript; the payment, invoice and CV records used in Part 1; and public documents and news reports.

The original message images and audio recordings were not independently examined and authenticated for this publication. No information was supplied explaining how the speakers’ identities had been confirmed. The private messages and recorded conversation are therefore presented as allegations recounted in the dossier. Quotations are taken from that dossier; they are not described as having been checked line by line against the original recordings.

The dossier says the documents reached The Ledgers through MasterNomine. No further source authentication or investigation status was confirmed for this report. Sending a document to a prosecutor does not mean that an investigation has been opened or that a crime has been committed.

Only the portions of the private communications described as relating to public contracts are discussed. The source reporting PDF, WhatsApp screenshots and audio recordings are not being published.

Why and how the consultancy relationship was to be ended while public contracts continued remains the central question for the parties to explain.

Based on reporting from: The Ledgers · SICPA dossier, part 2 · Supplied editorial document; The Ledgers · Why did SICPA hire Cuneyd Zapsu?; The Ledgers · SICPA / DNS; Cuneyd Zapsu · Biography; M. Akif Hamzaçebi · Bandrol; Correio Braziliense · 27.05.2019; SICPA · 27.04.2023; OCCRP · 17.11.2020; European Commission · PMI agreement · 2004; UK Parliament · PMI agreement; Swissinfo · Philippe Amon portrait reference; İleri Gazetesi · Cuneyd Zapsu portrait reference.

Source documents

12
  1. The Ledgers · SICPA dossier, part 2 · Supplied editorial documentNo public link supplied
  2. The Ledgers · Why did SICPA hire Cuneyd Zapsu?theledgers.news
  3. The Ledgers · SICPA / DNSNo public link supplied
  4. Cuneyd Zapsu · Biographyczapsu.com
  5. M. Akif Hamzaçebi · Bandrolakifhamzacebi.com
  6. Correio Braziliense · 27.05.2019blogs.correiobraziliense.com.br
  7. SICPA · 27.04.2023globenewswire.com
  8. OCCRP · 17.11.2020occrp.org
  9. European Commission · PMI agreement · 2004anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
  10. UK Parliament · PMI agreementpublications.parliament.uk
  11. Swissinfo · Philippe Amon portrait referencestories.swissinfo.ch
  12. İleri Gazetesi · Cuneyd Zapsu portrait referenceilerigazetesi.com.tr

File updates

  1. First published

    Report published

  2. Status updated

    Investigation ongoing

    Editorial research status recorded.

Editorial note

This report draws on the account and quotations in the supplied reporting dossier, alongside public sources. The original WhatsApp images and audio files were not independently examined and authenticated for this publication; the speakers’ identities were not confirmed. No information is available establishing whether questions were sent to the parties or whether replies were received. These gaps mean the accounts of private messages and recordings cannot be treated as verified facts. The source PDF, private message images and audio recordings are not being published. A consultancy relationship or payment does not by itself establish wrongdoing.

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